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Modern banking institutions were virtually non-existent in the planned economies of cen-
tral Europe and the former Soviet Union.  In the early transition period, banking sectors 
began to develop during several years of macroeconomic decline and turbulence accompa-
nied by repeated bank crises.   However, governments in many transition countries learned 
from these tumultuous experiences and eventually dealt successfully with the accumulated 
bad loans and lack of strong bank regulation. In addition, rapid progress in bank privatiza-
tion and consolidation took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, usually with the partic-
ipation of foreign banks.  By 2005, the banking sectors in many transition countries had 
developed sufficiently to provide a wide range of services with solid bank performance.  
Recently, banks have switched their focus from lending to enterprises in a somewhat un-
derdeveloped institutional environment to new collateralized lending to households, which 
accounts for much of the recent growth of credit in many transition countries. 
 
Keywords: transition banking, bank privatization, foreign banks, bank regulation, credit 
growth. 
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Keski-Euroopan ja entisen Neuvostoliiton suunnitelmatalouksissa  ei ollut nykyaikaisia 
pankkeja. Järjestelmämuutoksen alettua pankkijärjestelmät alkoivat kehittyä, mutta kehi-
tystä häiritsivät bruttokansantuotteen romahdus ja useat pankkikriisit. Useimmat siirtymä-
talousmaiden hallitukset kuitenkin ottivat oppia näistä kokemuksista, mikä auttoi ratkaise-
maan suuriin luottotappioihin liittyvät ongelmat. Lisäksi pankkijärjestelmän valvontaa pys-
tyttiin vahvistamaan. Pankkien yksityistäminen ja pankkisektorin konsolidaatio etenivät 
nopeasti 1990-luvun lopulla ja 2000-luvun alussa. Tässä yhteydessä monet ulkomaiset 
pankit saivat myös jalansijaa siirtymätalouksien pankkimarkkinoilla. Vuoteen 2005 men-
nessä useimpien siirtymätalouksien pankkijärjestelmät olivat jo tarpeeksi kehittyneitä tarjo-
takseen laajan valikoiman pankkipalveluita asiakkailleen. Viime vuosina pankit ovat siir-
tyneet yritysrahoituksesta enemmän kotitalouksille myönnettäviin vakuudellisiin lainoihin, 
mikä selittää suuren osan nopeasta luotonannon kasvusta.   
 
Asiasanat: Pankkitoiminta siirtymätalouksissa, pankkien yksityistäminen, ulkomaiset pan-
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1  Introduction: the distinctive character of banking in  
transition countries 
 
Banking in the transition countries is particularly interesting because banks played no eco-
nomic role in planned Soviet-style economies while financial sectors in most transition 
countries are now dominated by banks rather than equity markets.  Hence, our first topic in 
this overview is the emergence of banking sectors from the planned economies.  The birth-
ing process was hardly smooth; it took place amidst massive macroeconomic collapse and 
considerable economic uncertainty.  Not surprisingly, these nascent banking sectors expe-
rienced crises ranging from serious bad loan problems to total collapse.  The next section 
deals with the responses to the bad loan problem, the process of bank privatization, and the 
development of the necessary regulatory framework.  The following section characterizes 
the structure of the more mature banking sectors in the leading transition countries, with 
particular attention paid to the dominant role of foreign banks.  Banking sectors in many 
transition economies have developed remarkably quickly and now look little different from 
their counterparts in other emerging market economies except for the distinctive high per-
centage of foreign ownership.   Nevertheless, these banking sectors are not immune to 
problems and do not always provide sufficient impetus for economic development, which 
is problematic because of the bank-dominated financial sectors of most transition econo-
mies.  Our last section considers the problems of, and prospects, for banks fulfilling this 
role in the European transition countries.  To illustrate the commonalities and differences 
in the transition experience, we have selected ten representative countries from three re-
gions Central Eastern Europe (CEE), South Eastern Europe (SEE), and the former Soviet 
Union. We divide the countries into two groups. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia (CEE) along with Russia, as the largest and most important of the former So-
viet republics, make up the first group; Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia 
(SEE) constitute the second group. 
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2  The emergence of banking institutions in the early stages 
of transition 
 
Banking sectors in the European transition economies were relatively underdeveloped 
compared with the real economies in these countries due mainly to the legacies of the pre-
transition centrally planned economy. As examples of real sector development, Czechoslo-
vakia had a relatively modern automobile industry, Hungary produced buses, and Bulgaria 
made computers and software for use within the Soviet bloc. However, in the planning 
framework, financial intermediation between savers and borrowers was internalized wholly 
within the state banking apparatus.  Capital was allocated through a system of directed cre-
dits to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for both investment needs and budget allocations for 
the working capital necessary to meet the output plan.  Credit evaluation and risk manage-
ment played no role in lending decisions.  The national monobank served only as an ac-
counting clearing house for inter-enterprise transactions. Cash issuances by enterprises 
were based on planned wage bills that were calibrated to the expected aggregate value of 
consumer goods sold to households at administered prices. Money was entirely passive in 
that it was used solely as a unit of account in enterprise transactions and as a medium of 
exchange between households and the state distribution sector.  Household savings, often-
times the result of forced accumulation of monetary balances due to the unavailability of 
desirable consumer goods to purchase, were collected by a state savings bank that operated 
an extensive branch network throughout the country.   
Pre-transition banking sectors typically included a foreign trade bank that handled 
all foreign currency transactions to isolate these from the domestic financial system and 
often contained separate specialty banks to oversee the financing of the agricultural and 
construction sectors.  In this environment, banking was segmented along functional lines 
and credit allocation was entirely subservient to the plan. Hence, structural segmentation, 
state control of banking activities, and high concentration ratios are the major legacies in-
herited from the planning period by the banking sectors in the European transition econo-
mies.  Despite these commonalities, important differences among the experiences of coun-
tries both prior to and during the transition period yield unique characteristics. As an ex-
ample, we begin with a brief discussion of banking in the SEE transition countries that 
were former republics of Yugoslavia because their sectors inherited somewhat special leg-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




acies. We continue with a consideration of the initial developments in banking during the 
first half decade of the transition followed by a more detailed look at several European 
transition countries. This section concludes with a discussion of foreign bank participation 
in the early transition years. 
In the 1950s, Yugoslavia established a two-tier banking system with a traditional 
central bank located in Belgrade, the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY), and republic-
level commercial banks. Banks were owned collectively, as were all enterprises under the 
Yugoslavian system of self-management.  Because Yugoslavia was a small, open econo-
my, commercial banks made a significant number of loans denominated in foreign curren-
cy throughout the 1980s.  However, these republic-level banks were required to remit most 
of their foreign exchange deposits to the NBY in exchange for credits in dinars.  Hence, the 
balance sheets of republic-level banks exhibited a serious currency mismatch between as-
sets and liabilities by the late 1980s. Upon the secession of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, 
the NBY froze the forex deposits of the republic banks in these two countries creating 
large holes in their balance sheets. Although the legacies of segmentation and state-
ownership found in the banking sectors of CEE transition economies were not initially 
present in Croatia and Slovenia, high concentration ratios and a substantial accumulation 
of problem loans are important legacies from the Yugoslavian past.  Government rehabili-
tation policies that were designed to deal with bank insolvency led to the nationalization of 
most banks; hence, state-owned banks were created at the beginning of the transition in 
Slovenia and Croatia.  
The first step in banking sector reform for most transition economies involved the 
creation of a two-tier system with commercial activities carved out of the portfolio of the 
national monobank. The top tier consists of a traditional central bank that is charged with 
pursuing monetary policy, including exchange rate policy, and is given responsibility for 
supervising and monitoring the nascent banking sector.  The second tier consists of the 
newly created state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), the state-owned specialty banks, 
which themselves morphed into SOCBs, any operating foreign and joint-venture banks, 
and all private domestic banks, including those that entered after the political change.  As a 
rule, lax entry requirements led to the creation of many new private banks, some of which 
were of dubious quality, or even fraudulent, and virtually all of which were severely un-
dercapitalized.  In the former republics of Yugoslavia, this entry occurred well prior to John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




transition, in the late 1970s, when the establishment of many internal company banks led to 
excessive numbers of small unhealthy and undercapitalized banks.  Hence, the seeds for a 
banking crisis were planted at the beginning of the transition, or even before, in virtually 
all transition countries due partly to the adoption of lax entry requirements with the intent 
of fostering competition for state-owned banks in highly segmented banking sectors.   
Moreover, the nascent regulatory systems were overwhelmed by the mismatch between 
their capabilities, which were severely restricted by a lack of human capital, and their 
mandates provided by quickly adopted standard financial rules and regulations, especially 
given the inherited loan portfolios of the SOCBs.  
Although each country’s financial restructuring program involved hiving off the 
commercial bank portfolio of the national bank to establish the two-tier system, different 
approaches were taken toward the creation of SOCBs, all of which were established initial-
ly as wholly state-owned joint-stock entities. In Hungary, the commercial portfolio was 
divided along sectoral lines, e.g., industry, agriculture, and infrastructure plus the nascent 
small business sector, to create three SOCBs.  In Poland, the commercial portfolio was di-
vided along regional lines to create nine SOCBs from regional offices of the national mo-
nobank.  The commercial portfolio of the Czechoslovak national monobank was separated 
into two parts regionally to create two SOCBs, a Czech and a Slovak one.  After the Velvet 
Divorce, each new country had a single large SOCB.  Similarly, in Romania, only one 
SOCB was created from the entire commercial portfolio of the national monobank.  All 
CEE countries and Russia had specialty banks that obtained universal banking licenses 
and, thus, became SOCBs after the transition. 
At the opposite extreme, full separation of all commercial activities from the Bulga-
rian national bank’s balance sheet occurred in 1990 when each of its 145 branch offices 
was granted a universal banking license that allowed it to pursue commercial business ei-
ther as an individual entity or in combination with other branches. Again, the intent of this 
policy was to foster competition. As a result, 59 SOCBs were formed and, in 1992, the 
Bank Consolidation Company was established to oversee and orchestrate the eventual con-
solidation of the Bulgarian banking sector by the government.  By 1995, 41 banks were 
operating in Bulgaria and the two largest SOCBs were the former state foreign trade bank 
and the former state savings bank.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




In Russia, then the Soviet Union, the two-tier banking system was established in 
1987 with the separation of all commercial bank functions from the national monobank 
and the creation of sectoral banks by enterprises or former branch ministries.  As in Bulga-
ria, branches of the national bank became independent entities and then regrouped into 
larger banks.  In addition, new entry into Russian banking was dramatic. By 1995, about 
2,300 banks were licensed and operating in Russia. Most of the newly created banks were 
small and poorly capitalized. Some of them were merely internal or house banks owned by 
industrial enterprises. However, by 1996, six of the de novo domestic private banks had 
grown sufficiently to be among the ten largest banks in Russia, a group that included the 
former state foreign trade bank and the former state savings bank as the two largest SOCBs 
(Abarbanell and Meyendorff, 1997).  
Policies toward foreign bank participation, both in establishing subsidiaries and in 
purchasing equity stakes in SOCBs, differed considerably across the transition countries.  
In some countries, policies that invited entry, e.g., providing tax holidays, encouraged 
Greenfield foreign operations. In others, licensing was restrictive and foreign banks were 
limited to taking minority stakes in SOCBs or to participating in the resuscitation of ailing 
smaller domestic banks. Foreign participation in the banking sector was viewed initially by 
most governments as a vehicle for importing banking expertise and training to augment the 
scarce domestic human capital in the sector. Even before the political change, the Hunga-
rian government pursued a liberal licensing policy toward foreign financial institutions. 
The Central-European International Bank Ltd. was founded as an off-shore joint-venture 
bank by six foreign banks and the Hungarian National Bank in 1979; in 1986, Citibank 
Budapest Ltd. began operations as a foreign-majority-owned, joint-venture bank. By 1995, 
foreign financial institutions held almost 42% of banking assets in Hungary due in large 
part to the privatization of two SOCBS to foreign owners. The next highest percentage of 
foreign ownership by the middle of the first decade of transition is found in Slovakia, a 
country that opened up to foreign bank penetration rapidly after the Velvet Divorce.  In 
contrast, the Czech Republic and Poland restricted new licenses for foreign Greenfield op-
erations and invited foreign owners to take only minority equity positions in existing 
Czech and Polish banks. These governments followed a more protectionist strategy, taking 
an infant industry approach according to which domestic banks are nurtured to become 
strong enough to fend off foreign competition when it arrives. By 1995, only about 16% John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




and 4% of the banking assets in the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively, were owned 
by foreign financial institutions.  As Table 1 indicates, no other major transition country 
had more than 4% of its banking assets held by foreign institutions by the end of 1995.   
See Table1 below 
For the most part, governments in transition countries succeeded in establishing the 
foundations for building commercial banking sectors early in the transition period.  How-
ever, developing efficient banking sectors required the completion of three interrelated 
tasks namely, the resolution of non-performing loans, the privatization of the SOCBs, and 
the establishment of effective regulatory institutions. We discuss the progress made on 
these fronts during the first decade of transition in the next section. 
 
 
3  The development of modern banking sectors during the 
first decade of transition 
 
As described in the previous section, the typical banking sector in a transition economy 
consisted initially of state-owned banks that were carved out of the planned economy 
structure along with newly established small private domestic banks.  Some countries be-
gan to privatize the large SOCBs quickly and also opened up to foreign bank entry early in 
the transition.  However, the creation of market-based legislation and institutions did not 
lead automatically to good banking practices.  To the contrary, the SOCBs and the newly 
created banks often did not behave like proper commercial banks due to distorted incen-
tives.  
First, the SOCBs continued to maintain banking relationships with their large 
clients, i.e., state owned enterprises (SOEs). Such lending was either politically mandated 
or simply the result of long-standing relationships between clients having little experience 
in choosing viable projects and banks unable to evaluate the risk of loans.  Second, in 
many countries, de novo banks were created without adequate regulatory oversight. As a 
result, some de novo banks were used to channel loans improperly to their owners, many of 
which were enterprises so that these banks acted as pocket banks for their owners.  Entry 
requirements for de novo domestic banks were initially very lenient because policy was 
based on the mistaken notion that competition would be enhanced by easy entry. The proli-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




feration of new, often undercapitalized, banks placed an added burden on an underdeve-
loped regulatory structure.  Although most countries adopted modern banking and regula-
tory legislation immediately, effective supervision did not follow automatically due partial-
ly to the scarcity of human capital.   
Not surprisingly, bad loans were a serious problem for all transition economies due 
partly to the inherited legacies but also to continuing lending practices. The ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans in 1995 averaged 25.9% in the four CEE countries (Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia, see Table 1). For the four major SEE countries 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria) the average in 1995 was 18.8% of the total 
loans on the books.  However, information about the performance of borrowers in a rapidly 
changing environment is revealed only slowly under the best of circumstances so that these 
measures are only illustrative of the serious overall problem of bad loans.  Most govern-
ments responded to failing banks with efforts to save them from closure by recapitalization 
and the removal of bad loans from their balance sheets. For small insolvent banks, mergers 
with state-owned banks were used commonly. Repeated problems were inevitable because 
recapitalizations addressed only the stock of existing bad loans.  
In the absence of independent market-oriented banking institutions, the flow of new 
bad loans continued to accumulate. Regulators did not have proper incentives, the requisite 
expertise, or sufficient independence to cope with this problem.  To some extent the bad 
loan problem was unavoidable because transition recessions and the dissolution of trading 
relationships within the Soviet bloc generated severe real sector shocks that were mirrored 
on the balance sheets of the banks.  Nonetheless, even though the roots of this problem 
were difficult to resolve, the average ratios of non-performing loans to total loans had fal-
len to 6.4% for the four CEE countries and 5.9% for the four major SEE countries by 2005. 
To examine the resolution of the bad loans problem in more detail, we consider several 
country experiences. 
The Hungarian government began to clean up the portfolios of its banks in the early 
1990s when it enacted strong bankruptcy laws, new accounting regulations, and a new 
banking law. At the time, the Hungarian government provided guarantees to cover a por-
tion of the debts of SOEs. However, firms continued to accumulate debts in arrears so that 
a second policy to address bad loans was introduced in 1992.  The government replaced 
non-performing loans on bank balance sheets with government securities and transferred John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




these assets to a government collection agency.  Further recapitalizations introduced an 
element of moral hazard into the banking relationship. The situation changed when the au-
thorities began to pursue an aggressive strategy of selling controlling stakes of the large 
SOCBs to foreign investors, signaling a credible commitment to no further bailouts.     
However, such a privatization strategy was not without difficulties as exemplified by an 
early transaction. The sale of a controlling stake in Budapest Bank, the third largest SOCB 
in Hungary, to GE Capital in 1995 was controversial because the buyer was given the right 
to off load bad loans that were uncovered after the sale.  Nonetheless, the banking exper-
tise and discipline imposed by foreign owners of the three major SOCBs in Hungary led to 
rapid improvements in the banking environment.  By the end of the 1990s, the Hungarian 
banking sector was well capitalized, loan quality had improved, claims on the state were a 
declining share of bank assets, bank staffing declined, bank margins narrowed and, inci-
dentally, bank regulation improved markedly (OECD, 1999; Hasan and Marton, 2003).  
The government in the Czech Republic developed an explicit and detailed plan for 
privatization of most state-owned institutions, including SOCBs, using vouchers rather 
than direct sales.  Initially in 1991, bad loans were removed from bank balance sheets and 
replaced with government bonds while the bad assets were taken over by a newly estab-
lished hospital bank, Konsolidacni Bank. These resulting recapitalized large SOCBs were 
privatized by placing a minority stake of bank stock in the voucher program.  However, 
non-state ownership of these partially privatized banks was dispersed with the largest 
stakes held by bank-related investment funds. Furthermore, the bank-related funds held 
ownership interests in their unrestructured industrial clients so that the large banks contin-
ued to lend to SOEs, which resulted in more bad loans.  Hence, the key problems in the 
Czech Republic were interconnectedness between banks and their clients resulting from 
voucher privatization and the lack of independence of bank governance from a state hold-
ing controlling stakes in the banks. As a result, the resolution of bad loans required several 
rounds of recapitalization by the government, which increased the state’s stake further and 
necessitated a second round of privatization.  In this final round, foreign investors were 
allowed to take majority stakes in the large Czech banks and bank behavior changed ac-
cordingly. The continuing efforts to restructure the Czech banks over the first decade of 
transition were expensive with total costs amounting to more than 25% of 1998 GDP (Bo-
nin and Wachtel, 2004).    BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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In other countries, banking crises reached systemic proportions and severely im-
peded the overall transition to a market economy.  In Bulgaria, weak bank governance and 
poor regulation of the many small SOCBs created from the commercial portfolio of the 
original mono bank resulted in considerable asset stripping and insider lending.  In addi-
tion, the macroeconomic shock of transition in Bulgaria was severe; in 1996, real GDP de-
clined by 10%.  Repeated rounds of recapitalization of banks resulted in a total cost to the 
government at 42% of 1998 GDP, which made the Bulgarian banking crises one of the 
most costly of all transition countries.  A currency board introduced in 1997 restored ma-
croeconomic stability in Bulgaria and the banking system was rationalized quickly thereaf-
ter.  In Romania, the dominant SOCBs accumulated large portfolios of bad loans and also 
required massive capital injections from the government.   Non-performing loans peaked at 
58% in 1998. In both of these SEE countries, severe macroeconomic shocks led to serious 
banking and sustainable economic growth resumed only after these crises were resolved.  
After a decade and a half of transition, privatization of SOCBs is largely completed 
in CEE and SEE, although the situation is different in many countries emerging from the 
former Soviet Union.  As the Czech and Hungarian experiences indicate, the privatization 
process differed considerably across the European transition countries.  In Poland, the first 
bank privatizations utilized a combination of domestic initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
tenders to sell non-majority stakes to a strategic foreign investor.  The Polish stock market 
was not very large; trading was not very extensive and bank stocks were the largest issues 
traded. Thus, bank IPOs were difficult to price and accusations of market manipulation 
lead to the political defeat of one of the early governments.  The new government devel-
oped a bank consolidation program as an alternative approach to privatization and at-
tempted to force mergers and acquisitions of banks but not without controversy.  In one 
case, the attempt to include an already partially privatized bank (BPH) in the program 
caused a public uproar.  Delays in privatization followed; almost a quarter of Polish bank 
assets remained in state hands as late as 2005.  The two large banks that were still state-
owned in that year, PKO (zloty savings bank) and BGZ (agricultural bank), had not parti-
cipated in either consolidation or the privatization program.  
Most of the later bank privatization programs in Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
the Czech Republic involved negotiated deals between the government and a single foreign 
bank, sometimes after a tender.  In most transition countries, state ownership basically dis-John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




appeared over a five-year period around the turn of the century. For the four CEE coun-
tries, average assets in state-owned banks were 27.1% of the total in 2000 and 5.9% five 
years later.  For the four SEE countries, the average was 45.6% in 2000 and 8.0% in 2005.  
However, both the method, e.g., attracting a strategic foreign investor, and the timing of 
privatization matter to bank performance.  Even after considering selection effects, Bonin, 
Hasan, and Wachtel (2005b) conclude that voucher-privatized and late-privatized banks 
lagged in performance and efficiency relative to non-voucher and early-privatized banks  
The surprising aspect of banking in the transition countries is not the depth of the 
crises after the end of communism but the speed with which financial restructuring took 
place subsequently.  The rapid changes in the last decade can be attributed to two related 
phenomenon.  First, the desire of European transition countries to qualify for EU member-
ship was a strong force for reform, not only in the eight original transition accession coun-
tries but also in the later joiners and in countries still hoping to join. Thus, improvements in 
bank regulation and investments in the banking sector took place rapidly.  Second, the 
prospect of EU membership (and ultimately the adoption of the Euro) made these under-
serviced banking markets attractive to European banks once macroeconomic stability was 
attained and reasonable regulations were in place. However, the governments in many 
transition countries were reluctant to allow foreign ownership for all the common argu-
ments that attempt to show that foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking, unlike all other 
FDI, is dangerous.  The usual claims that foreign-owned banks would facilitate capital 
flight and fail to provide credit for local economic development were made.  As noted ear-
lier, Hungary was the exception in that foreign banks were allowed to operate even before 
the transition and SOCBs were sold to foreign investors early in the transition.  However, 
other transition governments took longer to realize that privatization to foreign buyers is 
not only a source of revenue but also a means of improving bank performance to support 
intermediation in the new market economy.    
The proportion of assets in foreign-owned banks rose from virtually zero in the ear-
ly 1990s to more than half in most countries a decade later. By 2005, the average share of 
assets in foreign-owned banks was 84.5% in the four CEE countries and 61.9% in the four 
SEE counties.  In most cases, privatization by itself was not sufficient to improve bank per-
formance; rather joint ownership with foreign strategic investors was the crucial determi-
nant in behavioral change (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005a).  The FSU countries are an BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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exception; foreign banks are not a major factor in Russia or in any other former Soviet re-
public, except for the Baltic countries.  To some extent, this outcome follows from banking 
regulations that inhibit foreign entry and from reluctance on the part of many governments 
to accept foreign dominance of the banking sector.  For example, although Russia has re-
laxed its limits on the overall size of the foreign banking sector, it sets minimums for the 
number of Russian employees and board members in foreign banks. In addition, unstable 
supervisory environments and weak legal protection have deterred foreign interest in such 
investments.  
The characteristics of banking in Russia differ considerably from patterns found in 
CEE and SEE.  In addition to three dominant SOCBs, Russia has a large number of mostly 
very small private commercial banks and many pocket banks having industrial owners.  
Some of these banks were involved in speculative activity and many were insolvent when 
the Russian government defaulted on its debt in 1998.  At the time, weak bankruptcy laws 
and poor regulation made it difficult to close institutions so that the managers or owners 
were able to strip banks of any remaining good assets.  The severe crisis in the banking 
sector did not have too large an impact on the real economy because the credit to GDP ra-
tio was considerably lower in Russia than such ratios in the CEE transition countries and 
cash was used widely for transactions throughout the FSU.  Exacerbating the economic 
crisis in 1998 was uncertainty about the economic and legal environment. 
Since the crisis, the Russian banking sector has shown some signs of improvement.  
Although more than 1,200 banks still operate, this number is roughly half of the total in 
1995 (Table 1) due to consolidations and closures. In addition, the influence of foreign 
banks is increasing as three foreign-controlled banks (including Citibank) are among the 15 
largest banks in Russia.  Moreover, financial intermediation has increased as the bank asset 
to GDP ratio is double its level before 1998, though still lower than in the European transi-
tion countries.   Nonetheless, some of the private banks still operate as private financial 
services institutions for their energy-sector owners and provide little overall intermedia-
tion. The banking system is still fragmented with many small and poorly capitalized insti-
tutions characterized by poor governance, inadequate risk management and high operating 
costs. Although deposits have increased, household savings are still largely held in the 
state savings bank, Sberbank, or in cash (Steinherr, 2006).   Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank, 
the former foreign trade bank, have begun to provide credit to the private sector even John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




though the government has no current plans to privatize either of these SOCBs.   Sberbank 
is the dominant bank in Russia holding more than 25% of all banking assets at the end of 
2005. The next two largest banks in Russia were also SOCBs; Vneshtorgbank had about 
7% market share and Gazprombank had 4.5% market share. At that time, no other Russian 
bank had a market share above 2.4% (Barisitz, 2007, Table 5.20, p. 130). 
In all countries, successful restructuring and privatization in the financial sector de-
pend on the establishment of an effective institutional and legislative infrastructure to sup-
port proper regulation. In addition to developing an arms-length legislative framework for 
banking regulation and supervision, bankruptcy laws and international accounting stan-
dards are required to change the behavior of economic agents who are accustomed to oper-
ating in a non-market environment. Moreover, training of bank supervisors and other types 
of professional human capital development are needed to promote effective implementa-
tion of the legislation.   Although the basic legal framework for modern banking was estab-
lished early in the transition, additional related elements that are crucial for its effective 
functioning took more time to develop.  In particular, a modern banking sector needs a 
functioning credit information system, which includes a credit registry and ratings agen-
cies, and a reliably functioning court system to mediate contract disputes. 
Hungary took the lead among the transition countries in promoting such institution-
al development with a legislative shock therapy program in 1992.  In January, the govern-
ment promulgated new, modern banking legislation, instituted international accounting 
standards, and revised its bankruptcy law to include a draconian trigger that resulted in a 
large number of company insolvencies.  In addition, Poland developed a computer-
supported system of bank oversight at the beginning of the transition and had in place ra-
ther stringent bankruptcy legislation for private firms even before the political change.  
Other countries took considerably longer to address these problems and, as a consequence, 
bank restructuring and privatization took longer to complete. 
  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




4  The maturation of transition banking sectors 
 
The distinctive characteristic of the rationalization of banking sectors discussed in virtually 
all transition countries is the rapid emergence of foreign-dominated ownership.  As Table 2 
reports, the asset share of foreign-owned banks was less than 50% in 1999 in all ten of the 
countries listed, except for Hungary and Poland.  By 2005, Table 3 indicates that only the 
Russian and Slovenian banking sectors exhibited such a small level of foreign participa-
tion.  The asset share of foreign-owned banks in CEE and SEE countries is now among the 
highest of any banking sector in the world with Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
recording percentages above 90% and Hungary not far behind at 84% in 1995.  In addition, 
Serbian banking experienced a remarkable transformation over a five-year period; foreign 
ownership increased from a negligible amount in 2000 (0.5%) to 66% in 2005.  Russia and 
Slovenia remain outliers on this measure with foreign participation at only about 11% and 
23%, respectively, in 2005.  However, the asset share of state-owned banks was lower in 
Slovenia at 12% than in Russia (38%), Serbia (24%), and Poland (21.5%).  Hence, Slove-
nia appears to be an anomaly among European transition economies with respect to the 
ownership structure of its banking sector. 
See Table2 and Table3 below 
Regarding the pace of restructuring, the results from 1995 to 1999 are mixed. The 
EBRD index of banking reform increased for six of the countries but it actually decreased 
for Russia and Romania with no change in the index recorded for Serbia and Slovakia (Ta-
ble 2).  By 1999, only Hungary had a rating of 4.0 on a scale from 1.0 to 4+, where the 
highest score reflects full convergence to performance norms and regulation standards of 
advanced industrial economies.  By 2005, the Czech Republic and Croatia joined Hungary 
with scores of 4.0 while six of the seven other countries recorded an increase in the index 
from 1999 (Table 3).  Hence, banking sectors in most transition countries have reached, or 
are rapidly approaching, their counterparts in developed market economies with one major 
difference, namely, an extremely high foreign bank presence.  Russia and Slovenia are the 
outliers on both counts. 
Based on the legacy of segmented sectors and exacerbated by consolidation pro-
grams, banking concentration is high in most transition countries.  In 2005, the three-firm 
concentration ratio ranged from a high of over 65% in the Czech Republic to about 33% in John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




Bulgaria, with six of the ten countries listed in Table 3 having a ratio above 40%.  Moreo-
ver, the five-firm concentration ratio in all SEE countries was 50% or above. Only Poland 
and Russia had five-firm ratios below this threshold.  However, high concentration ratios 
have not prevented competition from developing in many of these banking sectors. As Ta-
ble 4 indicates, interest rate spreads declined considerably since the beginning of the transi-
tion, which may be attributable more to reduced risk in the macroeconomic environment 
than to increased banking competition.   
See Table4 below 
Considerable differences exist among countries with respect to interest rate spreads. 
In 2005, Hungary had the lowest spread while Romania and Serbia still had spreads above 
10%. Of these ten countries, only Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia had average spreads 
from 2001 to 2005 under 5%, which we take to indicate a reasonably competitive banking 
sector.  Interestingly, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Poland had lower average inflation 
rates during this period but higher interest rate spreads.  By 2005, Bulgaria joined the 
countries having interest rate spreads below 5%.  Of these four countries, Croatia and Slo-
venia have relatively high three-firm concentration ratios at over 50%. Regarding foreign 
participation in the banking sector, Slovenia is the outlier with less than 23% of assets in 
foreign-owned banks in 1995.  Moreover, the Czech Republic and Poland have high per-
centages of banking assets in foreign banks and low inflation rates but relatively high in-
terest rate spreads. Thus, the experiences of the European transition countries indicate that 
neither high foreign participation in the banking sector nor low inflation is a sufficient 
condition for competitive interest rate spreads.  
The ratio of bank deposits to GDP is a measure of both banking sector development 
and public confidence in the banking system.  By comparing the entries in Tables 2 and 3, 
we find considerable differences across countries in this ratio and in its changes from 1999 
to 2005.  In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the ratio of bank deposits to GDP was fairly 
high in 2005 although it had decreased considerably since 1999, which may suggest some 
decline in public confidence. In Croatia, the ratio of bank deposits to GDP increased dra-
matically to the highest of any of the ten countries by 2004, which reflects both a credit 
boom and increased confidence in banks. The 2005 ratios for Hungary, Romania, and Rus-
sia show modest growth of around five percentage points from 1999 while Poland expe-
rienced virtually no change in this ratio. Both Bulgaria and Serbia experienced considera-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




ble increases in deposits to GDP from 1999 to 2005.  Public confidence in banks is impor-
tant to a well-functioning banking system in any transition economy.  Based on the ratio of 
deposits to GDP, the evidence is mixed but the laggards are improving rapidly. 
According to the EBRD Transition Report of 2006, the banking sectors of transition 
economies have exhibited considerable growth and diversification since 2000, although 
further progress in financial deepening is considered to be both feasible and desirable.  On 
the lending side, four of the ten transition countries listed in Tables 2 and 3 experienced 
increases in the ratio of loans to GDP of more than 20% from 1999 to 2005.  Ratios in 
2005 (or 2004 when indicated) in Slovenia and Croatia were around 56%, which equaled 
the worldwide average of domestic credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP.  Hun-
gary at about 45% and Bulgaria at about 35% have the next highest ratios. Of the other six 
transition countries, only Slovakia had a ratio of loans to GDP above 30% by 2005 with 
the other five between 21% (Romania) and 28% (Czech Republic and Poland).  As a fur-
ther basis for comparison, the EU average for this measure of financial depth was 86% in 
2005.  Hence, even the four leading transition countries are well below the EU average in 
providing credit to the private sector. 
In the same document, the EBRD reports that the share of loans to households in-
creased sharply in CEE and SEE countries with much of the increase due to mortgage 
lending. By 2005, domestic credit to the household sector as a percent of GDP ranged from 
a high of over 34% in Croatia to less than 10% in Romania, Russia, and Serbia (Table 3).  
Retail credit accounted for well over half of all loans in Croatia and around half of the total 
in the Czech Republic and Poland.  Mortgage lending as a percent of GDP in 2005 ranged 
from highs of around 12% in Croatia and Hungary to moderate levels of about 8% in the 
Czech Republic and around 5% in Bulgaria and Poland to virtually nothing in Romania 
and Russia (Table 3).  Non-mortgage household credit is particularly large in Croatia 
(22.3% of GDP).  To what extent the recent explosion of retail credit in some transition 
countries will lead to instability in the banking sector is yet to be determined but it will be 
influenced considerably by the use to which credit has been put and the possibility of real 
estate bubbles occurring.  
Household credit, in particular mortgage lending, depends on well-defined property 
rights over collateral and an effective legislative infrastructure to facilitate the collection of 
collateral in case of default.  Hence, the dramatic growth of both types of lending in many John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




transition countries reflects significant improvements in supportive institutions.  Nonethe-
less, differences in retail lending ratios across these ten countries are large.  Consistent 
with the other measures of financial intermediation, retail credit data indicate considerable 
progress in banking in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary.  More sluggish development in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland may be inferred from the intermediation data.  Ro-
mania, Russia, and Serbia appear to be either laggards or late starters in all areas of bank-
ing sector reform.  Finally, Slovenia is an anomaly in that its ratio of loans to GDP is near 
the top of all ten countries in 2005 but retail credit, and especially mortgage lending, lag 
well behind these activities in many other countries. 
 
 
5  Evaluation of transition banking and prospects for the  
future 
 
Although banks in the transition countries have made rapid strides in improving perfor-
mance and services since the early 1990s, the banking sectors in the European transition 
economies still do not posses the financial depth of their EU counterparts nor are banking 
services as well developed in these countries.  Nonetheless, with few exceptions (primarily 
in the FSU), the transition in banking is complete. State mono banking structures have 
been replaced by privately owned, market-oriented, well-capitalized banking institutions 
that are independent from the government and from state-owned clients.  The legal envi-
ronment has improved with respect to bankruptcy laws, collateral laws, and confidence in 
the application of the law.  Furthermore, banking regulatory and supervisory capabilities 
have developed considerably.  Thus, any evaluation of the structure of banking in transi-
tion countries must be positive. However, banking conduct is a somewhat different matter; 
any evaluation of what banks are doing and how they are contributing to economic perfor-
mance in the transition economies must be more nuanced.   
The ratio of bank credit to GDP depends on the financial structure of a country; it 
will be larger in bank-centered financial systems than in countries having more-developed 
capital markets.  For the transition countries, the financial depth ratio is well below indus-
trial country levels, although the numbers are not unusual for countries having similar GDP 
levels.  In some CEE countries, this ratio has fallen as bad loans have been removed from BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




balance sheets while GDP has grown.  Deepening has occurred in the major FSU countries 
with the achievement of financial stability and the resulting return of public confidence in 
banks. Financial deepening or increasing intermediation has been shown to be associated 
with more rapid economic growth in cross-country studies (Wachtel, 2001).  Thus, the in-
creased credit ratios in the SEE should be viewed as a positive development even though 
they have been met with concern in some countries, i.e., in Croatia where the ratio went 
from 35.7 to 55.8 in five years as Tables 2 and 3 indicate and in Bulgaria where it in-
creased from 10.7 to 34.9 over the same period.  The main concern is that credit deepening 
has come in the form of rapid growth in mortgage lending and other forms of consumer 
credit.  
Lending to households has grown rapidly in many countries.  In 2005, it was more 
than one-half of total bank lending in Croatia and in the Czech Republic.  Despite rapid 
increases in household credit, ratios of household credit to GDP are still not large by de-
veloped country standards.  However, the ratio of household credit to the financial wealth 
of the consumer sector is high in Croatia and elsewhere suggesting some vulnerability of 
consumers to economic shocks (EBRD Transition Report, 2006).  Although rapid credit 
increase might have long term growth benefits in general, it could also be a sign of exces-
sive risk taking and financial vulnerability.  
The expansion of household lending in transition countries may be related to the 
dominance of foreign-owned banks.  Once the legal environment is in place, lending to 
households is a commodity business that can be entered easily through the application of 
banking technology from abroad.  In contrast, lending to enterprises requires developing 
client relationships and having the ability to evaluate unique situations, both of which re-
quire expertise that is generally lacking in foreign banks. Using a recent EBRD survey, 
Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) show that banks in many transition economies have shifted 
their asset portfolios out of government securities towards mortgages and consumer credit.  
Foreign banks in particular have increased consumer lending and only maintained the ex-
isting level of lending to enterprises.  The EBRD/World Bank surveys of enterprises in 
transition countries indicate that many firms are financially constrained in the sense that 
they are unable to obtain bank lending.  Based on these surveys, the EBRD concludes that 
“despite some regional variation, bank loans still play a limited role in enterprise financ-
ing” (EBRD Transition Report, 2006, p. 47).  Since lending to enterprises is important to John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




support economic growth, this finding has important implications for any evaluation of the 
conduct of banking in transition countries. 
Foreign banks have had a positive influence on the banking environment by intro-
ducing technology, operational efficiencies, and new products and services.  However, Ha-
selmann and Wachtel observe that foreign banks have focused on lending to households 
and large firms.  In addition, the EBRD surveys provide little evidence of increased lend-
ing to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). To some extent, the lack of SME lending in a 
foreign-bank-dominated country is understandable because such lending requires local 
knowledge. However, the large foreign banks were created by mergers and acquisitions of 
local entities so that this knowledge should not be prohibitively difficult to acquire.  More-
over, the surveys suggest that improvements in the legal environment for banking have 
been associated with greater risk taking and more credit extended to SMEs (EBRD Transi-
tion Report, 2006; Haselmann and Wachtel, 2007). Frequently, the survey respondents in-
dicate that a lack of creditworthy borrowers and difficulty in evaluating risks were the 
main reasons for slow loan growth.  In their lending activity, banks in transition countries 
tend to favor large firms and foreign affiliates currently. However, improvements in the 
legal and regulatory institutions are expected to induce more SME lending.  Hence, envi-
ronmental improvements such as good bankruptcy laws, efficient ownership structures, 
reliable court systems for their application, credit registries, and defined legal rights to col-
lateral should lead to more lending to SMEs and more support of local entrepreneurs in the 
future (de Haas and Lelyveld 2006). 
Overall the growth in banking in transition countries has increased considerably the 
availability of financial services, many of which were simply not obtainable before.   
Whether banks can become formidable engines of sustainable economic growth in transi-
tion economies is an open question.  Many large enterprises, particularly in the EU new 
member states, are able to take advantage of recent increases in European capital market 
integration and obtain financing from abroad.  Furthermore, non-bank financial institutions 
are emerging in the transition economies. Nonetheless, the rapid expansion of credit in 
some countries has become a source of concern because of the accompanying potential in-
creases in risk to the banking sectors. In addition, much of the lending by banks in some 
transition countries, particularly the SEE countries that experienced hyperinflation in the 
1990s, is denominated in foreign currencies and many deposits are denominated in non-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




national currencies as well.  Thus, the balance sheets of banks in these countries are ex-
posed to foreign exchange risk.  In Croatia, 70% of mortgages are denominated in Euros. 
Even though the deposit base of these banks is also in Euros, foreign exchange risk is not 
eliminated by this matching because a domestic slowdown or exchange rate shock would 
affect the ability of domestic borrowers to repay in Euros. 
These risks and indeed many of the problems, faced by banks in transition countries 
are familiar to banks in small, open, emerging-market economies around the world.  More-
over, the tradeoff between bank consolidation and bank concentration is relevant to other 
small banking sectors. Although consolidation eliminates inefficient and undersized insti-
tutions, it also increases concentration, which may limit competition and create systemic 
risks.  To some extent, free entry and foreign bank participation can mitigate this anti-
competitive tendency. Although foreign bank penetration is a worldwide phenomenon in 
emerging-market economies, it is more prevalent and more concentrated in a subset of 
home countries in transition economies. European banks, mainly from the Netherlands, 
Italy, and Austria, are most active due to particularly strong trading relationships or to a 
desire to enter expanding new markets close to their own countries. Overall, foreign-owned 
banks have maintained their lending activities in the presence of local shocks, although 
their aggressive growth targets may be a source of instability in the future. 
The relationship between parent banks and their local partners is a mixed blessing.  
In some cases, the parent bank provides assistance for a troubled local institution, e.g. KBC 
from Belgium supported its troubled Polish subsidiary, Kredytbank.  However, parent bank 
support can not be taken for granted, e.g. Bayerische Landesbank walked away from its 
Croatian subsidiary, Rijecka Banka, when fraud was uncovered. In addition, ownership 
changes in the parent bank can affect the structure of banking in the host country.  When 
HVB joined the Unicredito banking group, several Polish subsidiaries were merged to 
create the largest bank in Poland with a market share in excess of 25% despite objections 
from the Polish authorities.  These close connections with specific foreign banking sectors 
combined with high concentration in local banking may leave some transition countries 
vulnerable to economic shocks in other countries, e.g., Netherlands, Italy or Austria. 
Banking regulation in the European Union follows the home country principle in 
that the home country regulators supervise the consolidated balance sheet of multinational 
banks.  At the same time, the host country regulators have responsibility over the local John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel 
 
 




subsidiaries. Hence, a potential for conflict arises if a home country regulator does not 
have sufficient interest in a foreign subsidiary that is a small part of a multinational bank 
but an important player in the financial sector of the host country.  Unfortunately, the lack 
of explicit coordination of bank regulation across borders is a problem that the EU will 
probably avoid facing until the first cross-border banking crisis hits. 
In summary, considerable strides have been made in developing mature banking 
sectors in virtually all European transition countries. However, this positive evaluation 
must be tempered by some concerns about future stability due to the dominance of foreign 
banks from a handful of countries.  The less-advanced transition countries, largely the 
smaller republics of the FSU, are just beginning to create modern banking sectors.  These 
countries now have models to emulate; hence, their progress toward achieving mature and 
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Table 1   Banking Sector in Early Transition, 1995 
 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia 
  Number of Banks 
(Foreign Owned Banks) 
Asset share of  
Foreign Banks, % 
Credit/GDP, 
% 




Czech Republic 55 (23)  15.9  46.7  26.6  3.0 
Hungary  43 (21)  41.8  22.7  12.1  3.0 
Poland  87  (18)  4.2 12.7  23.9 3.0 
Slovakia  33 (18)  32.7  26.3  41.3  2.7 
Russia  2,297 (21)  < 1  8.7  12.3  2.0 
 
South Eastern Europe (SEE)  
  Number of Banks 
(Foreign Owned Banks) 
Asset share of  




% of total 
EBRD In-
dex 
Bulgaria  41 (3)  < 1  21.1  12.5  2.0 
Croatia  54 (1)  < 1  22.9  12.9  2.7 
Romania  24 (1)  < 1  7.8  37.9  3.0 
Serbia  112 (3)  < 1  9.2*  12.0  1.0 
Slovenia  39 (6)  3.8  27.3  9.3  3.0 
 
Notes:  * indicates data for 1996.    
The number of banks with the number of foreign-owned banks in parentheses is taken from the country tables in EBRD Transition Report, various issues. 
FOB is the asset share of foreign-owned banks in total banking assets from Barisitz (2007), except for Slovenia. Slovenian data are from Bonin (2004). 
Credit/GDP is domestic credit to the private sector at year end from Barisitz, except for Slovenia.  Slovenian data are from EBRD Transition Report, 2003. 
Non-performing loans as a percent of total loans at year end from Barisitz, except for Slovenia.  Slovenian data are from EBRD Transition Report, 2003. 
EBRD Index is the EBRD index of reform of banking sector reform from EBRD Transition Report, 2003; it takes values between 1.0 and 4.0+.   
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Table 2   Banking Market Characteristics in Later Transition, 1999 
 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia 
 
  Ownership – Asset shares  Intermediation  EBRD  
Index      State owned  Foreign owned  Deposits/ GDP  Loans/ GDP 
Czech Republic  41.2  27.1  66.1  44.6  3.3    (+) 
Hungary  7.8  65.3  36.4  24.6  4.0    (+) 
Poland  23.9  69.5  35.4  27.1  3.3    (+) 
Slovakia  50.7  24.6  57.1  48.4  2.7    ( 0 ) 
Russia  41.9 (1998)  10.6*  10.2 (2000)  13.1 (2000)  1.7    ( - ) 
 
South Eastern Europe (SEE) 
 
  Ownership – Asset shares  Intermediation  EBRD  
Index     State owned  Foreign owned  Deposits/ GDP  Loans/ GDP 
Bulgaria  50.5 44.7 21.3 10.7  2.7      (+) 
Croatia  39.8 39.9 34.0 35.7  3.0      (+) 
Romania  50.3  47.8  20.5  10.6  2.7   ( - ) 
Serbia  90.9#  0.5#  9.7  29.6  1.0   ( 0 ) 
Slovenia  42.2  4.9  32.0##  35.8  3.3   (+) 
 
Notes:  * indicates share in registered statutory capital.  # indicates data for 2000 and state-owned includes social ownership. ##  indicates data for 2000 and for primary depo-
sits only. 
1.  Ownership is the asset share of state-owned and foreign-owned banks, respectively, in total banking assets from Barisitz, except for Slovenia. Slovenian data are from 
EBRD Transition Report, 2005. 
2.  Deposits of and credit to the private sector at year end are in percents of GDP from Barisitz (2007), except for Slovenia where data for deposits are from Bonin (2004) and 
data for credits are from EBRD Transition Report, 2005. 
EBRD Index is the EBRD index of banking sector reform from EBRD Transition Report, 2005; it takes values between 1.0 and 4.0+.   Also, (+ ) indicates an increase in the 
index from 1995, ( 0 ) indicates no change, and ( - ) indicates a decrease in the index from 1995. 
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Table 3   Banking Market Characteristics in 2005 
 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia 
  Ownership   Intermediation – ratio to GDP  Concentration   EBRD  
Index     State Foreign  Deposits  Loans  HH loans  Mortgages  3-firm  5-firm 
Czech R.  2.5  94.5  55.9*  27.3*  13.9   7.9   65.4  75.6  4.0   (+) 
Hungary  7.0  84.5  40.1  44.8  15.7  11.6  41.9  56.6  4.0   ( 0 ) 
Poland  21.5  74.2  34.6*  27.4*  12.6   5.1   33.4  45.3  3.7   (+) 
Slovakia  1.1  97.3  47.7*  32.5*  13.0   3.6   47.7  66.3  3.7   (+) 
Russia  38.1  11.2**  17.7  25.7  4.9  0.2  37.0  41.7  2.7   (+) 
 
South Eastern Europe (SEE)  
  Ownership   Intermediation – Ratio to GDP  Concentration  EBRD  
Index     State Foreign  Deposits  Loans  HH loans  Mortgages  3-firm  5-firm 
Bulgaria  1.7  72.8  36.0*  34.9*   14.7   4.8   32.8  49.9  3.7   (+) 
Croatia  3.4  91.2  59.8*   55.8*   34.3   12.0   55.3  75.3  4.0   (+) 
Romania  6.5 59.2  26.1  20.9 7.3  0.6 48.3  59.8  3.0      (+) 
Serbia  23.9  66.0  25.1  25.0  7.6  1.4  37.3  53.2  2.7   (+) 
Slovenia  12.0  22.6  n/a  56.4  14.5  3.6  50.4  73.3  3.3   ( 0 ) 
 
Notes:  * indicates data for 2004. **  indicates share in registered statutory capital.  
Ownership is the asset share of state-owned and foreign-owned banks, respectively, in total banking assets from Barisitz, except for Slovenia. Slovenian data are from EBRD 
Transition Report, 2006. 
Deposits of and credit to the private sector at year end are in percents of GDP from Barisitz, except for Slovenia. Slovenian data for deposits are from Bonin (2004) and data for 
credits are from EBRD Transition Report, 2006.  HH/GDP is the ratio of total outstanding bank credit to households at year end to GDP from EBRD Transition Report, 2006.  
Mortgage is the ratio of mortgage lending to households at year end to GDP from EBRD Transition Report, 2006.   
Concentration measures are computed as market shares of the top number of banks indicated and from Barisitz, except for Slovenia. Slovenian data are for 2000 from Bonin 
(2004). 
EBRD Index is the EBRD index of banking sector reform from EBRD Transition Report, 2005; it takes values between 1.0 and 4.0+. Also, (+ ) indicates an increase in the index 
from 1999,  ( 0 ) indicates no change, and ( - ) indicates a decrease in the index from 1999. 
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Table 4  Interest Rate Spreads and Inflation, 1991-2005 
 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia 
 
  Interest Rate Spread  CPI Inflation Rate 
  1991-1995  2001-2005 2005 1991-1995  2001-2005 2005 
Czech Republic  6.5 (1992-95)  6.5  6.0  12.1 (1992-95)  2.2  2.2 
Hungary  8.0 2.5 2.2  24.9  5.2 3.3 
Poland  10.5 7.1  5.9 38.7 2.2  0.7 
Slovakia  6.1 (1993-96)  4.8  4.5  12.4 (1993-96)  5.8  3.7 
Russia  43.9 (1996-98)  8.7  7.5  39.1 (1996-98)  13.7  10.9 
 
South Eastern Europe (SEE)  
 
  Interest Rate Spread  CPI Inflation Rate 
  1991-1995  2001-2005 2005 1991-1995  2001-2005 2005 
Bulgaria  29.4 6.1  4.9  127.4  5.0  6.5 
Croatia  13.6 (1994-96)  8.7  8.3  1.4 (1994-96)  2.4  3.6 
Romania  21.5 (1993-96)  15.8  11.5  110.6 (1993-96)  16.0  8.6 
Serbia  86.4 (1996-98)  15.8  11.7  37.5 (1996-98)  18.3  17.5 




1. Spreads are computed as the difference between lending rates and deposit rates from the country tables in EBRD Transition Report, various issues. Maturities are always 
less than one year but they differ across countries.  
2. CPI is inflation computed by year end changes in the Consumer Price Index.  Data are taken from the country tables in EBRD Transition Report, various issues. Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
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